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Title: Mental Health Street Triage 
Abstract:  
This paper explores the implementation of Cleveland Police’s pilot Street Triage service. The service 
aimed to reduce the number of section 136 detentions under the Mental Health Act and improve 
referral pathways for those presenting with mental health issues. The initiative was funded by Tees, 
Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust. Dedicated Street Triage mental health nurses 
accompanied police officers to incidents where it was suspected that mental health issues were a 
presenting concern. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with sixteen strategic and 
operational stakeholders to review whether the project was successful. Analysis was supplemented 
with secondary data from the Street Triage Team. We conclude that there were significantly fewer 
section 136 detentions, and identify continuing challenges. 
Key words: s136, mental health, police 
Introduction 
Responding to people presenting with mental health issues is a difficult area of police work not 
simply confined to matters of enforcement (Riley et al, 2011a; Morgan et al, 1991). Reports from 
across the globe suggest that the level of contact between the police and the mentally ill continues 
to increase (College of Policing 2015; Clifford, 2010; Coleman and Cotton, 2010; Moore, 2010). 
Various service delivery models have been introduced to support the police in dealing with people 
with mental health issues (Chappell, 2010). 
In this paper we explore one model trialled in England since 2012. ‘Street Triage’ (ST) was initially 
introduced in two police force areas to “improve the experience, outcomes and access into health 
services for individuals at the point of crisis” (Fleming and Smith, 2014, p.5). We investigated the 
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operation and impacts of a ST service developed in the North East of England to determine its level 
of ‘success’. 
The Problem  
Estimates of police incidents linked to mental health in England and Wales vary widely between 2-
40% (College of Policing, 2015; House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2015). However using 
an average of 20% provides a national estimate of almost 4m mental health related incidents per 
year.  
Attempts to explain the reasons behind the increasing contact between the police and people with 
mental health problems include the deterioration of mental health services so that the police have 
become the de facto first aid response to mental distress (House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee, 2015; Reuland et al, 2009; Cherret, 1995).  
There are various powers available to the police in England and Wales if they encounter someone 
who they believe is a risk either to themselves or others because of their mental health, including 
Sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (amended 2007). Using these sections, police 
officers are able to detain people against their will and take them to a place of safety in order that 
they can undergo a mental health assessment by a qualified practitioner (Greenberg et al, 2002). 
According to a report by the Health and Social Care Information Centre (2014) the number of those 
detained under s.136 has increased by 5% (1,166) to 23,343 since 2012/13.  
Concerns about the use of s.136, include police reports of feeling unqualified or lacking in 
confidence (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2015; Adebowale, 2013; Bather et al., 
2008; Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2008), potentially leading to growing numbers of short-duration 
s.136 detentions i.e. where people are detained by the police but immediately released following 
mental health assessment as no mental health problem is identified; or because there are more 
appropriate referral pathways for those who do have mental health problems. 
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The levels of cost involved in the use of s.136 in both negative personal experiences (Gregory and 
Thompson, 2013; Riley et al, 2011b) and resource terms are high. North Yorkshire Police estimate 
the average length of time in custody for a person detained under S.136 is 10 hours. Therefore, for 
the 6,028 people in 2013/14 held in a police cell, this equates to 60,000 hours of officer/staff time 
per year. When a health based place of safety was used, waits of 6 to 8 hours for police officers were 
not uncommon. For the 17,000 people in 2013/14 held in hospital, this equates to an additional 
62,000 hours a year (College of Policing, 2015).  
Recommendations to support police officers when dealing with someone with mental health 
problems generally centre on the need for improved partnerships between the police and health 
services. However a study carried out in Scotland to investigate police officers’ views on their roles in 
dealing with people with mental health problems (Mclean and Marshall, 2010) reported a number of 
recurrent themes including failures of collaborative working with health services. Pre-arrest 
‘diversion’ was recognised as an option by police officers – there may be no indication for arrest, and 
they did not want to arrest individuals unnecessarily – but gaps in health services could result in 
inappropriate detention in police cells, reminiscent of the so-called ‘mercy booking’ reported in the 
USA (Watson et al., 2008). Many services are already in place across the UK providing health 
expertise into the criminal justice system, but these have been piecemeal and tend to focus on 
events after the individual has been detained (Dyer, 2013).  
One solution to the lack of early intervention has involved the development of ST teams, initially 
piloted in 2012 in Cleveland and Leicester.  Funded by the Department of Health and supported by 
the Home Office, they were subsequently rolled-out to a further nine areas in 2013. The broad aim 
of ST is to prevent s.136 detentions where possible and therefore the consequent negative impacts 
on individuals and resource costs. The service delivery model has varied across the pilot areas, and 
we focus specifically on the approach adopted by the Cleveland ST in the North East of England. 
 Current Study 
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This study was commissioned by Tees, Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust (TEWV) to 
describe the initial problem which prompted the development of the Cleveland ST team, a process 
evaluation of current service delivery, and a critical analysis of the extent to which the service aims 
were being achieved. The Cleveland ST team had been developed and introduced in 2012 because 
the number of s.136 detentions was considered disproportionately high (Docking, Grace and Bucke, 
2008). Figures from Cleveland Police for the period 2010-2011 indicated that 511 people were 
detained on a s.136 and around three quarters (388) were released as no mental health issue was 
identified (King, 2014; Short and Whitelock, 2013; Cleveland Police et al, 2012). The cost of 
detention was estimated at £1,780 per person (based on a methodology developed by the Sainsbury 
Centre for Mental Health, 2009). Cleveland Police’s analysis suggested that if the three quarters of 
people (76% or 388) had not been detained, there would have been a cost saving of £690,000 to 
Cleveland Police from their budgets over the year (Cleveland Police et al, 2012). It was also 
acknowledged that there would be less distress for the individuals concerned and more appropriate 
support provided. 
The Cleveland Street Triage Service 
The aim of the ST team is to reduce detentions under the Mental Health Act where appropriate and 
instead provide more appropriate referral pathways for people of all ages presenting with potential 
mental health and social care issues (King, 2014). The mental health ST nurses are based at Police 
Headquarters between 12 noon and midnight where they monitor calls for indications of mental 
health problems or can be directly requested to attend an incident by police colleagues. The nursing 
assessment informs further care planning including decisions to ‘section’ or refer to other support 
services. 
Study Design 
5 
 
Our methodology comprised an exploratory design that included interviews with sixteen key 
stakeholders, a retrospective analysis of case notes and  interrogation of a dataset collected for 
administrative purposes by the ST staff from 2012-2014. 
Results 
An overview of referrals and activity 
Analysis of the ST dataset, from August 2012–February 2014 inclusive, reported the ST service had 
received 572 referrals (4% of the total number of Cleveland Police incidents reported 12 midnight-12 
noon as ‘concern for safety’ PS10, n=15937). This is consistent with research that suggests that 2-
40% of police incidents are linked to mental health (College of Policing, 2015; House of Commons 
Home Affairs Committee, 2015). There was an average 30 referrals per month (minimum 15, 
maximum 63); the majority were adult, male, and over half (51%) were already known to the local 
Mental Health NHS Trust. 39% of those assessed had a primary or co-morbid substance misuse 
problem, 33% a mental health problem, 2% a learning disability, and 1% ADHD.  
During the period when ST were on duty (August 2012-February 2014, 12 noon-12 midnight), a total 
of 13 s.136 detentions were made (i.e. 0.08% from a total n= 15937 incidents reported as ‘concern 
for safety’ PS10; although only 2 were detained as a direct result of ST advice, the remainder were 
against advice or people were already detained when nurses arrived at the incident), compared with 
558 detentions when ST were not on duty (August 2012-February 2014, 12 midnight-12 noon; 7% 
from a total n=7995 incidents reported as ‘concern for safety’ PS10) (Table 1). 
(Table 1 here) 
The police made 545 more s.136 detentions than those involving the ST Team. The Cleveland ST 
Steering Group estimated the current ST pilot costs NHS commissioners £170,000/year. Based on 
the assumption that each s.136 costs £1,780, the cost of the police detentions was £993,240 
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compared with £23,140 for the ST (a difference of £970,100 for detentions alone – or £800,100 
including the cost of the ST pilot) – although caution is advised as it is unclear whether the 
unsupported police group were dealing with a more unwell population, or what the situation would 
have been like if the ST team was on duty during the same period. 
However the primary aim of the Cleveland ST service was to prevent short-duration detentions 
under the Mental Health Act where better alternatives were possible. One way to measure this is to 
consider the numbers of subsequent hospital admissions – what proportion of those detained by the 
police were subsequently assessed by health professionals to be sufficiently ill or in crisis to warrant 
detention in hospital for further assessment or treatment?   
In order to compare the impact the ST service had on s.136 detentions we took referrals to the ST 
team as a tentative proxy for police s.136 detentions when ST are not on duty, i.e. if the team had 
not been on duty the referrals made to them would otherwise have resulted in a s.136 (although the 
caution advised above regarding the lack of information about the comparability of the two cohorts 
remains)  (Table 2).  
(Table 2 here)  
Table 2 describes a total of 558 people were detained by the Police on a s.136 when ST were not on 
duty i.e. between 12 midnight-12 noon (column 1); the majority (82%) were NOT admitted to 
hospital following assessment by mental health professionals because they were not considered 
sufficiently ill or in crisis to warrant admission (column 4) and might therefore have benefited from 
alternative referrals pathways rather than s.136 detention. Of the 572 assessments carried out by ST 
(column 5) the team recommended 2 people should be detained on a s.136 (column 6) both of 
whom were subsequently admitted to hospital, meaning all s.136 detentions as a direct 
consequence of ST advice were appropriate pathways. However 11 people were detained by police 
against ST advice (column 7), and all 11 were NOT admitted to hospital. Overall therefore while they 
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were on duty ST failed to prevent 2% (or 11 of 572 ST assessments) of s.136 police detentions where 
an alternative referral pathway might have been more appropriate, substantially lower (2% vs 82%) 
compared with the period they were not on duty. 
Rather than detention under the Mental Health Act the Cleveland ST service aimed to provide more 
appropriate referral pathways: 19% were already current to services at the time of referral, of the 
remainder services referred to included GPs (11%), Mental Health Crisis Teams (11%), Substance 
Misuse Services (11%), and Counselling/Talking Therapies (11%). 47% were followed up by the ST 
team and 61% of these reported engaging with services. The majority of those seen by the team 
were not re-referred within the 19 month data collection period (n= 432, 88%); 56 individuals were 
referred more than once (12%; including 9% twice, 2% three times, 1% four times, and 0.2%, 1 
person, six times). Although more information is needed to support a detailed analysis, initial 
examination of the data available suggests that those re-referred were more likely to have substance 
misuse problems, social issues around relationship and housing problems, and multiple, short-term 
contacts with mental health services.              
Strengths and Achievements 
A number of advantages to the co-location of mental health nurses with police officers were 
described during interviews with key stakeholders including reduction in the number of s.136 
detentions through the provision of timely on-scene advice and support for police officers leading to 
improved impacts and outcomes for service users.  
There was recognition that the role of police officers is increasingly complex and that they are often 
dealing with people who are experiencing complicated health, welfare and social care issues, for 
which officers are not equipped: 
“Somebody always has to take a lead…The NHS must take a lead and the police must support 
…I think police officers are being expected to do things that are beyond 
their...responsibilities…” (Police and Crime Commissioner’s Office) 
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The services offered by the ST team differed from those offered by existing services such as the Crisis 
Team (mental health emergency care). This was because nurses are based with police officers and 
are available to immediately respond (providing they are on duty) to police requests for assistance: 
 “…I think it’s the immediacy that the police were seeking… we [Crisis Team] couldn’t, you 
know, as soon as the police rang us, just go straight to number 7 [X] Street to see what was 
going on with that person …the police always wanted someone they could, just immediately 
call on to respond…we’re not a blue light service, we’ve never been a blue light service.” (Crisis 
Team Staff) 
The positive impact on service users including the avoidance of unnecessary distress, stigma and 
criminalisation was acknowledged by police officers: 
 “…when the street triage team go, they get a better service. Certainly get better handling … 
where ever the person is at a time of crisis, and threatening to harm themselves, saying, I want 
to hang myself…I just want to kill myself, leave me alone… then giving them a bit of a brief 
intervention, talking to them, and making arrangements for them, their care, moving forward, 
to speak to their family has to be a good thing. For a mental health professional to be able to 
do that is fantastic because that person then does not go into detention, they do not end up in 
police cell or a hospital where they don’t want to be… whereas the police couldn’t make those 
sorts of judgement calls, so the service user often ends up in custody at the police station.” 
(Police Officer) 
Feedback from service users was obtained by the ST staff asking two short questions when they 
completed their follow up telephone interviews during March to May 2014. The comments that 
were received indicated a high level of satisfaction with the service and an appreciation of the 
support that they would not have received before the introduction of ST: 
“Talking to the team helped put things in perspective and got me help very quickly.” (Service 
User) 
Challenges and Limitations 
A number of tensions were identified as a result of the ST project that for some, detracted from the 
perceived successes associated with it. These included concerns about the rise in the number of 
‘self-presenters’, repeat referrals, and tensions in relationships between services. Some of these 
issues, it was suggested, arose in part because of funding limitations which meant the team 
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operated part-time impacting on the availability and timeliness of the response they could offer, as 
well as a lack of understanding and agreement about the focus of the ST Service which highlighted 
tensions between services and teams.  
The first challenge related to concerns about the rise in ‘self-presenters’ and centred on the claim 
that the number of people taken to hospital by the police on a ‘voluntary’ basis (driven to the 
hospital by police officers and left at the front desk) was rising. Some police officers, it was 
suggested, were bypassing the ST service because the team were unavailable; some police officers 
argued it was easier and quicker to take the person to hospital themselves if the individual agreed to 
attend on a voluntary basis rather than wait for ST to attend the scene; or they disagreed with the 
advice given by the ST nurse:  
“…it’s been borne out that…they’ve [police officers] ignored advice, they’ve detained someone 
and brought them to a place of safety only for them to be released as not being mentally ill, 
and that was the advice in the first place…you’re always going to get that, that’s human 
nature, that some people will disagree and think they know better. And for others, you know 
for whatever reason, they’ll think, I’m not bothering waiting for Street Triage I’m going to do 
this anyway.” (Street Triage Steering Group) 
It was acknowledged that part of the problem related to the ‘part-time’ nature of this pilot service. 
The team are available 12 noon-12 midnight:  
“...we’ve looked at a 24/7 service…it’s what the police want. Unfortunately, nobody seems to 
have the money to pay for that” (Street Triage Staff).  
As with other criminal justice/ health initiatives cost saving tends to happen for one agency based on 
investment by another other – so the cost saved by the police from reductions in s.136 detentions is 
based on investments by health services: 
“... the police are the ones who are seeing the most direct benefit...there’s not a lot of crumbs 
on the table at the moment…big financial pressures across various part of the health service…If 
there was evidence to say, suggest that this is actually saving the NHS a lot of money in urgent 
care costs… then I can see the CCG being interested in it. But, in hard times, these decisions are 
harder to get pushed.” (Clinical Commissioning Group) 
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The Cleveland ST Steering Group estimated the current ST pilot costs NHS commissioners 
£170,000/year; a fully staffed 24/7 service was estimated to cost £520,000/year – however overall 
cost savings were estimated at 1.2m/year (although this was confirmed as a Police Service saving 
only; a properly funded national evaluation is needed to estimate savings to the NHS in acute care 
costs): 
“… the last 12 month’s monies, what they did was gave us the same funding as we had for the 
pilot - £170,000 for 12 months which isn’t sufficient to run the service on, it’s the bare bones.  
It doesn’t take into account any management costs or you know, full staffing cost...5 days a 
month we can’t cover and that’s down to annual leave… sickness and all that because none of 
that was built into the process...when you set up a pilot you work on a bare bones of 
something ‘cos you’re looking at a model to see if it’ll work.  You’re not looking at a full blown 
service at that time... so to expect us to run now a full service on pilot monies is 
unreasonable…If we’re looking at a service to go 24/7… looking at about £520,000...total 
cost...About £220,000 would see us continue on a 12 hour service, but fully covered...full 24 
hours service…would be over £500,000 but the projected savings on that would be about £1.2 
million...[over a year].” (Street Triage Steering Group) 
The second challenge related to repeat referrals which while not completely unexpected as people 
in touch with mental health services may suffer relapse, could also reflect issues with the ST aim to 
improve outcomes for service users and lack of cooperation or tensions from other services. A small 
but significant cohort of people had been referred to the ST service more than once (572 referrals 
for 490 individuals; 58 individuals - 12% - referred more than once). The time elapsed between 
repeat referrals varied between 0 – 497 days (average 106 days, median 57 days); a third (33%) re-
presented within a month of their last referral. The characteristics of those repeatedly referred 
suggested they were more likely to have substance misuse problems, social issues around 
relationship problems and housing, and multiple, short-term contacts with services (possibly 
because of a lack of engagement by service users and/or from services) – a finding in line with 
Docking, Grace and Bucke’s (2008) review of the use of s136s and police custody as a place of safety 
who found those presenting as repeat referrals often had more complex needs, frequently 
compounded by substance misuse issues.  
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While there is a tendency to point the finger of blame at this group of clients and what is often 
described as their ‘chaotic’ lifestyle, research which seeks the opinions of service users themselves 
suggests engagement and retention problems often lie with the services themselves (Dean, 2003; 
Jeal & Salisbury, 2004; Rosengard et al, 2007; Anderson, 2011). Difficulties accessing services; a 
range of systemic barriers that impede access or are detrimental to care and can lead to repeated 
experiences of service rejection or delays in receiving help; and poor experiences of services 
following access (Anderson, 2010; Rosengard et al, 2007) have been identified. 
Issues around access to services are also the basis of the third challenge facing the pilot team. ST’s 
work meant that they came into contact with a number of different teams and had to manage a 
complex set of inter and intra-agency relationships, including with police officers, mental health 
service providers in the voluntary and statutory sectors, as well as manage their own internal 
networks. The main relationships, which involved the Police and the Crisis Teams, were 
overwhelmingly described in positive terms, with both services particularly supportive of the 
establishment, and continuing development of the pilot service. There were, however, ongoing 
issues. Those with the police have already been discussed in relation to ‘self-presenters’. In relation 
to Crisis Teams, this seemed to centre on the lack of clarity, or disagreement, or the testing of 
tolerances around roles and responsibilities. Before ST, the Crisis Teams were the services 
responsible for responding to crisis situations, including calls from the police. With the introduction 
of ST it seemed details were still being negotiated as new situations arose: 
“…and the police brought a gentleman ...if you self-present, it’s like you see the Crisis team but 
because the police had brought ...the Crisis team asked us …there’s nothing set in stone that 
because the police have brought him it has to be Street Triage. He’d actually self-presented 
and wanted to come here to see the Crisis Team because he thought he was in psychiatric crisis 
but [Street Triage] assessed him.” (Street Triage Staff) 
Discussion 
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The development of the ST model is not a new idea – various models of support (‘prebooking 
diversion programs’) have already been trialled in the USA. These include: Crisis Intervention Teams 
(CIT) where police officers have special mental health training to provide crisis intervention services 
and to act as liaisons to the formal mental health system (Morabito et al, 2012; Canada et al, 2010; 
Compton et al, 2010; Fisher and Grudzinskas, 2010; Ritter et al, 2010); and the Co-Responder model 
(most similar to that being trialled in England) which partners mental health professionals with law 
enforcement at the scene to provide consultation on mental health-related issues and assist 
individuals in accessing treatments and supports (Rosenbaum, 2010; Reuland et al, 2009). Steadman 
et al (2000) compared the outcomes of three major models of police responses to mental health 
emergencies in the USA – including the CIT/ Police Officer model; a variation on the CIT/Police 
Officer model, referred to as CIT/ CSO,  where community service officers (civilian police employees 
with professional training in social work or a related field) assist police officers in mental health 
emergencies by providing crisis intervention and some follow-up assistance; and the  Co-Responder 
model. The most popular and most likely to be called to a scene was the CIT/ Police Officer model – 
the CIT/ CSO and Co-Responder models suffered from lack of availability and delayed response times 
– limitations also recognised in relation to the Cleveland ST delivery model. The CIT/ CSO service was 
most likely to resolve incidents at the scene, the Co-Responder/ Mobile Crisis Unit models were 
most likely to refer people to specialist mental health services, and the CIT/ Police Officer model was 
most likely to physically take individuals to treatment locations. Overall these services were a third 
less likely to result in arrest compared with contacts between non-specialised police officers and 
people with mental health problems. 
The ST teams currently being trialled in England are most similar to the USA Co-Responder model. As 
with the American models, the co-location of expert support has had a significant impact on reduced 
detentions under the Mental Health Act, with the Cleveland ST team demonstrating an 80% 
reduction compared with police officers acting alone (the Leicestershire service reports a 40% 
reduction, MIND and Victim Support, 2013). 
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Conclusion 
The Cleveland ST project was valued by service users, the police and other statutory partners. 
Although some issues were identified, it is important to bear in mind the strong and universal 
endorsements that ST received. The ST service delivery model had developed flexibly to provide 
responsive services within existing financial constraints and uncertain ongoing funding streams and 
therefore, as in the USA, there are some variations in the model of service provision in different 
geographical areas in England, e.g. in Cleveland a team of mental health nurses based at police 
headquarters monitor calls, give advice, and attend scenes using their own transport; and in 
Leicestershire a police officer and mental health nurse staff a patrol car (the ‘Triage Car’) and 
respond to calls received together. There are potential benefits to allowing difference and the 
‘ground-up’ development of services especially during a pilot trial but there are also risks. While the 
Cleveland ST service meets its aims (by supporting police officers, reducing the number of s136s 
detentions, and providing improved service pathways to those with mental health difficulties who 
came into contact with the police), the challenges facing current ST pilots described by this study 
including ‘self-presenters’, repeat referrals, and relationships with other services fundamentally boil 
down to ‘funding and focus’.  
At a regional and local level, the agencies involved with the commissioning and provision of the 
Cleveland ST service have acknowledged the challenges associated with providing a service for 
clients with multiple and complex needs across the criminal justice and health systems. These 
challenges include developing a model which meets need within funding and staffing constraints, 
inter and intra-agency relationships and agreements, and engagement and retention issues. Issues 
around the importance of shared understanding and cooperation from other services have been 
noted, and ‘self-presenters’, repeat referrals, and related activity and outcomes will be monitored in 
order to identify ‘good’ pathways and relationships, including any gaps or issues. At some point 
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however there is a need to determine and nationally evaluate the funding, core principals and 
practice of ST if it is to continue to develop (HM Government, 2014).  
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Table 1: S.136 Detentions by the Police Alone and Involving Street Triage. 
Month and year S.136 Police S.136 St. Triage
Aug-12 45 4
Sep-12 51 1
Oct-12 40 1
Nov-12 25 2
Dec-12 29 0
Jan-13 31 1
Feb-13 30 1
Mar-13 24 1
Apr-13 34 0
May-13 22 1
Jun-13 15 0
Jul-13 37 0
Aug-13 30 1
Sep-13 25 0
Oct-13 19 0
Nov-13 31 0
Dec-13 26 0
Jan-14 27 0
Feb-14 17 0
Total number 558 13
Cost estimation 
(£1,780 per s.136 £993,240 £23,140
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Table 2: A Comparison of s.136’s (not leading to hospital admissions as no mental health problem was identified or a more appropriate referral pathway 
not used) between the Police and those involving Street Triage (based on referrals to S.T./column 5).  
Column 1-4 = while ST were not on duty (12 midnight-12 noon). Column 5-8 = while ST were on duty (12 noon-12 midnight). 
Month and 
year 
1.s136 Police 
detentions 
(equivalent 
process of ST 
assessment) 
2. s136 
Police 
detentions - 
admitted to 
hospital 
 3. s136 
Police 
detentions 
not admitted 
to hospital 
4. % of Police 
s136 
detentions 
not admitted 
to hospital 
5.ST 
assessments 
(proxy for 
police s136 
detentions) 
6.s136 
recommended 
by ST - admitted 
to hospital 
7. s136 Police 
detentions - not 
recommended 
by ST and not 
admitted to 
hospital 
8.% of  
detentions 
not admitted 
to hospital 
during ST 
duty 
Aug-12 45 8 37 82% 63 0 4 6% 
Sep-12 51 10 41 80% 20 0 1 5% 
Oct-12 40 6 34 85% 41 1 0 0% 
Nov-12 25 6 19 76% 43 1 1 2% 
Dec-12 29 6 23 79% 25 0 0 0% 
Jan-13 31 3 28 90% 16 0 1 6% 
Feb-13 30 5 25 83% 18 0 1 6% 
Mar-13 24 7 17 71% 26 0 1 4% 
Apr-13 34 3 31 91% 15 0 0 0% 
May-13 22 4 18 82% 27 0 1 4% 
Jun-13 15 1 14 93% 37 0 0 0% 
Jul-13 37 4 33 89% 40 0 0 0% 
Aug-13 30 4 26 87% 39 0 1 3% 
Sep-13 25 7 18 72% 26 0 0 0% 
Oct-13 19 7 12 63% 34 0 0 0% 
Nov-13 31 4 27 87% 27 0 0 0% 
Dec-13 26 3 23 88% 29 0 0 0% 
Jan-14 27 6 21 78% 18 0 0 0% 
Feb-14 17 4 13 76% 28 0 0 0% 
Total number 558 98 460 82% 572 2 11 2% 
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